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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA 
CENTRAL DIVISION
BRIAN D. SEIM,
Plaintiff,
v.
THREE EAGLES COMMUNICATIONS, 
INC.,
Defendant.
No. 09-CV-3071-DEO
ORDER
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Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed 
by Defendant Three Eagles, Inc., on January 6, 2011. Docket 
No. 13. As set forth below, the Court grants in part and 
denies in part Three Eagles' motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Beginning in November of 2008, Plaintiff Brian Seim 
worked as an on-air radio personality for Three Eagles, which
operates seven radio stations in the Fort Dodge, Iowa, area. 
Docket No. 13-3 at 5. Mr. Seim's starting position with Three 
Eagles was as the morning host of KWMT,1 though he later took 
on additional shifts later in the day. Docket Nos. 13-3 at 5. 
Seim had significant experience working as a morning radio 
host prior to joining Three Eagles. Docket No. 13-3 at 12. 
Seim was supervised directly by KWMT Program Director Joe 
Zimmerman when he started working for Three Eagles. Within a 
month or two of his start with the company, Seim began being 
directly supervised by Operations Manager Miles Riker and one 
of Riker's subordinates, Duane Murley, who was promoted to the 
KWMT Production Director position vacated by Zimmerman. Id. 
at 6, 67-68.
Mr. Seim suffers from Graves' disease, "an autoimmune 
disorder that leads to overactivity of the thyroid gland 
(hyperthyroidism)." PubMed Health, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. 
gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001398/. Seim's condition was previously 
treated with radiation therapy "that essentially destroyed his 
thyroid gland," and as a result he must now take medication 
designed to provide the hormones once produced naturally by
1 Seim testified in his December 21, 2010, Deposition that 
he arrived at work at 5:00 a.m. and his morning show lasted 
from 6:00 to 10:00 a.m. Docket No. 13-3 at 5.
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his thyroid. Docket No. 17-3 at 2. Seim claims he suffers
several symptoms of the disease, including rapidly 
deteriorating vision, weight fluctuation, insomnia, 
narcolepsy, anxiety, swelling and skin lesions of the lower 
extremities, and difficulty standing for long periods of time. 
Id.; see also Docket No. 13-3 at 8. According to Seim's 
deposition testimony, existing treatments can ease some, but 
not all, of these symptoms, but he cannot afford all such 
treatments. Docket No. 13-3 at 10-11. Seim claims he 
informed several members of management at Three Eagles he had 
a "blood disease" and would require occasional time off. 
Docket No. 17-3 at 3-5. Seim also claims that not long after 
his hiring, his medications began to make him drowsy and 
confused and caused him to slur his speech. Docket No. 17-3 
at 3-5, 8-10. Seim claims that these effects occurred in the 
early morning but wore off before mid-day; and for this 
reason, he requested transfer to several available afternoon 
shifts. Id. These requests were allegedly denied. Id. Seim 
further claims his disease makes standing for prolonged 
periods painful. Id. Radio broadcasters at Three Eagles 
typically stood during their on-air programs; Seim requested 
a chair to avoid prolonged standing. Id. Although the
3
request was allegedly denied, another employee brought a chair 
from the employee's home for Seim to use. Id.
In addition to these alleged refusals on the part of 
Three Eagles to accommodate Mr. Seim's Graves' disease and the 
side effects of medications, Seim alleges that during his 
employment with Three Eagles he was harassed on several 
occasions because he was perceived to be gay. Docket No. 17-3 
at 8-11. According to Seim, these incidents involved verbal 
taunts, inappropriate questions about Seim's sexuality, 
unwelcome physical contact, and vandalism of his car. Id. 
Seim specifically alleges that, on at least three occasions, 
Mr. Riker asked if Seim was gay; Riker also repeatedly 
inquired as to whether Seim's blood disease was AIDS; when the 
topic of a new women's bathroom at Defendant's Fort Dodge 
radio station came up, Riker stated that Seim should be sent 
to check it out; when Seim asked Riker if he could interview 
the first gay couple in Iowa to be civilly united, Riker 
responded that the story was "perverted" and said "I knew you 
were going to ask me that"; Riker refused to investigate two 
incidents in which Seim's car was vandalized with anti-gay 
graffiti while parked at Defendant's radio station; on the day 
Seim was terminated, Riker told Seim he knew he was a pansy
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the day he saw him; and on one occasion Riker pinched Seim's 
breast and told Seim he would make some man happy some day. 
See Docket Nos. 13-3 (Seim Dep.), 17-2 (Seim Stmnt. of Addt'l 
Mat. Facts in Resist. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.), and 17-4 
(Seim Aff.).
Mr. Seim claims he repeatedly complained to superiors 
that he was being discriminated against on the basis of his 
Graves' disease and his perceived sexual orientation, but that 
no actions were undertaken to resolve these issues. Seim 
resigned shortly after one such alleged complaint, but claims 
to have rescinded this resignation almost immediately. Three 
Eagles denies having any knowledge of such recision. Seim was 
ultimately terminated in May 2009.
Seim filed his complaint against Three Eagles on November 
5, 2009, alleging disability discrimination under federal and 
state laws, perceived sexual orientation discrimination under 
state law,2 retaliatory discharge in violation of federal and 
state laws, and wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy and under state law. Docket No. 2 (Seim's Complaint).
2 Although Mr. Seim's Complaint indicated this claim was 
being pursued under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, the parties 
have, in their subsequent pleadings and in argument before 
this Court, analyzed this claim under federal law. The Court 
will likewise consider this claim in this manner.
5
Three Eagles seeks summary judgment on all of the foregoing 
claims, and Seim resists summary judgment. Docket Nos. 13 and 
17. The matter came before the Court for oral argument on 
March 3, 2011, and is now fully submitted.3
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a). To support an assertion that a fact cannot be 
or is genuinely disputed, a party must cite "to particular 
parts of materials in the record," show "that the materials 
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 
dispute," or show "that an adverse party cannot produce 
admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(1)(A)-(B). "The court need consider only the cited 
materials, but it may consider other materials in the record."
3 Following the March 2011 Hearing, the Court ordered 
supplemental briefing to determine whether Seim had exhausted 
his administrative remedies as required to pursue his ADA and 
ICRA claims. Docket No. 23. The documentary evidence 
submitted by Seim in response to the Court's Order (including 
copies of his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission/Iowa 
Civil Rights Commission Charge and Right-to-Sue Letters, none 
of which had been made a part of the record in this case) 
demonstrate Seim did in fact exhaust his administrative 
remedies prior to filing the instant action. Docket No. 24-1. 
The parties have expressed to the Court that exhaustion is not 
a disputed issue in this matter.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (3) . In determining whether summary 
judgment is appropriate, a court must look at the record and 
any inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 255 (1986).
A. Seim's Disability Discrimination Claim
Mr. Seim claims Three Eagles discriminated against him 
because of his disability in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) .4 
Seim's ADA claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting 
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
4 When the parties in disability discrimination litigation 
"do not dispute the application of federal analysis, 
disability claims under the ICRA are generally analyzed in 
accord with the ADA." Gretillat v. Care Initiatives, 481 F.3d 
649, 652 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 
385, 391 (Iowa 2005)); see also Tjernagel v. Gates Corp., 533 
F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2008) ("ADA and ICRA disability claims 
are analyzed under the same standards."); Casey's General 
Stores, Inc. v. Blackford, 661 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2003) 
(providing that ICRA "only pronounces a general proscription 
against discrimination and we have looked to the corresponding 
federal statutes to help establish the framework to analyze 
claims and otherwise apply our statute"); Schlitzer v. 
University of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics, 641 N.W.2d 525, 529 
(Iowa 2002) ("The common goals of the Federal ADA and our 
civil rights act have encouraged us to look to the federal 
statutory and regulatory standards in applying our statute."). 
Therefore, the Court will analyze both Seim's ADA and ICRA 
disability discrimination claims using federal law. The Court 
will refer to both types of claims as "ADA claims" in this 
Order.
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(1973). To establish a prima facie case, Seim must establish
(1) that he had a disability within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) that he was qualified to perform the essential functions 
of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) 
that he was subject to an adverse employment action due to his 
disability. Duello v. Buchanan Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 628 
F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2010). If Seim establishes a prima
face case, then Three Eagles must come forward with a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse 
employment decision. Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 
F.3d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 2005). If Three Eagles does so,
then Seim must show that Three Eagles' reason was pretext for 
discrimination. Id. The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having 
such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1).5 To show that he
5 Congress recently enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA), effective January 1, 2009, which expanded the class 
of individuals entitled to protection under the ADA. Pub. L. 
110-325, § 2, Sept. 25, 2008, 122 Stat. 3553. The Court finds 
the ADAA should be applied in this case because Mr. Seim's 
claims all appear to stem from acts that occurred after the 
ADAA's effective date of January 1, 2009. Cf. Nyrop v. Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 11, 616 F.3d 728, 734 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (ADAA 
amendments are not retroactive and should not be applied to 
alleged acts of discrimination prior to its effective date).
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was qualified to perform his job, Seim "must demonstrate that 
he meets the essential prerequisites for the job . . . and 
that he can perform the essential functions of the job with or 
without a reasonable accommodation." Duello, 628 F .3d at 
972.
Mr. Seim argues that his Graves' disease and the side 
effects of medications he uses to treat it are a disability 
that substantially limited the major life activities of 
sleeping; standing; speaking; concentrating; thinking; 
communicating; working; and the functions of his immune, 
circulatory, and endocrine systems. Docket No. 17-3 at 3. In 
light of the record evidence—including Seim's Affidavit 
(Docket No. 17-4) and his deposition testimony (Docket No. 17­
5; see also Docket No. 13-3 at 4-47)—the Court concludes that 
a reasonable jury could find that Seim was substantially 
limited in these major life activities.
As for whether Mr. Seim was qualified to perform the 
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, Seim's position appears to be that, although he 
was initially able to perform the essential functions of his 
morning shift without accommodation, within a few months of 
his hiring, accommodations became necessary due to a worsening
9
of his condition and the emergence of several side effects of 
his medications. The parties agree Seim requested three 
accommodations: a chair, time off for medical treatment, and 
a later shift. Although radio personalities at the station 
typically stood during their broadcasts, Seim requested a 
chair because standing for this length of time— indeed, for any 
length of time beyond ten minutes—was allegedly very painful. 
Seim alleges he conveyed this to Riker, but Riker refused his 
request. (A few days later, Seim claims another employee 
brought a chair from the employee's home for him to sit on.) 
Seim alleges his requests for time off related to his 
disability were granted, but he was the only employee at the 
station who was required to provide documentary proof that his 
absences were medical in nature. Finally, Seim alleges he 
repeatedly requested transfer to available positions later in 
the day to accommodate his disability, but his requests were 
denied and the other positions were filled by less qualified 
individuals. Although the evidence supporting these 
allegations is not overwhelming, particularly in comparison to 
much of the contradictory evidence offered by Three Eagles, 
the Court nevertheless finds that genuine issues of material 
fact exist as to whether Three Eagles was aware of Seim's
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disability and whether Three Eagles failed to reasonably 
accommodate the disability. In addition, whether Three Eagles 
engaged in an interactive process to determine the appropriate 
accommodation and whether it was responsible for the 
breakdown, if any, in the interactive process are questions of 
fact for the jury.
Given the foregoing, the Court denies Three Eagles' 
motion for summary judgment on Seim's disability 
discrimination claims.
B. Seim's Perceived Sexual Orientation Discrimination Claim
Mr. Seim also claims he was discriminated against on the 
basis of his perceived sexual orientation, in violation of 
Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a).6 Seim alternatively characterizes
6 This section provides that it shall be an unfair or 
discriminatory practice for any
Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, 
classify, or refer for employment, to 
discharge any employee, or to otherwise 
discriminate in employment against any 
applicant for employment or any employee 
because of the age, race, creed, color, 
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
national origin, religion, or disability of 
such applicant or employee, unless based 
upon the nature of the occupation. If a 
person with a disability is qualified to 
perform a particular occupation, by reason 
of training or experience, the nature of 
that occupation shall not be the basis for 
exception to the unfair or discriminating
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this claim as one based on same-sex sexual harassment under
Title VII.7 The parties appear to agree this claim should be 
assessed under Title VII and the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas.8
To make a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, Seim has to show that "'(1) [he] was a member of 
the protected group; (2) [he] was qualified to perform the 
job; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
practices prohibited by this subsection.
Id. § 216.6(1) (a) (emphasis added); see also Iowa Code § 
216.2(14) ("'Sexual orientation' means actual or perceived 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.").
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (providing in relevant 
part that it is illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin."); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) ("If our precedents leave 
any doubt on the question, we hold today that nothing in Title 
VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of .
. . sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or 
the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are 
of the same sex."); accord Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., Inc., 187 
F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999); Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372 
(8th Cir. 1996).
8 The parties also appear to agree that this claim should 
be analyzed using federal law. Cf. Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1038 
("The parties agree that Lewis' ICRA and federal [same-sex 
sexual harassment] claims are analytically indistinguishable." 
(citing Quick, 90 F.3d at 1380)).
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circumstances permit an inference of discrimination.'" Lewis
v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Bearden v. Int'l Paper Co., 529 F.3d 828, 
831 (8th Cir. 2008)). "Such a showing creates a presumption 
of unlawful discrimination, requiring [Three Eagles] to 
produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
employment action." Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1038 (citing Bearden, 
529 F.3d at 831-32). "The burden then returns to [Seim] to 
prove that [Three Eagles'] proffered reason for firing [him] 
is pretextual." Id. (citing Bearden, 529 F.3d at 832).
Regarding the first step of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis in this case, Three Eagles challenges only Seim's 
ability to satisfy the fourth and final element of his prima 
facie case—that is, the required showing that the 
circumstances surrounding his termination permit an inference 
of discrimination. The evidence Seim relies on to satisfy 
this aspect of his prima facie case is the same evidence he 
relies on to show pretext at step three of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis. See Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 
732, 736 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[E]vidence of pretext—normally 
considered only at step three of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis— [can also] satisf[y] this aspect of the plaintiff's
13
prima facie case burden.").
Evidence that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Seim's 
termination permit an inference of same-sex sex discrimination 
include the sworn statements in Seim's Affidavit and his 
deposition testimony alleging that Mr. Riker repeatedly 
questioned Seim's sexual orientation and whether Seim had 
AIDS, Riker refused to investigate whether Three Eagles staff 
vandalized Seim's car with anti-gay graffiti, and Riker 
pinched Seim's breast and told him he would make some man very 
happy some day. See supra Part I on pages 3-4. The Court 
"recognize[s] that '[r]emarks at work that are based on sex 
stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part 
in a particular employment decision. The plaintiff must show 
that the employer actually relied on [his] gender in making 
its decision.'" Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)). However, 
Seim has met this burden at summary judgment stage by 
providing evidence that the comments he cites "were not 'stray 
remarks in the workplace, statements by nondecisionmakers, or 
statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional 
process itself[.]'" Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Simmons 
v. New Pub. Sch. Dist. No. Eight, 251 F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (8th
14
Cir. 2001)). Riker was Seim's direct supervisor and was the 
most senior employee at the affiliate Three Eagles station 
where Seim worked. And although several individuals besides 
Riker apparently took part in the decision to terminate Seim, 
they clearly relied to some degree on Riker's recommendation 
that Seim be terminated. Docket Nos. 13-1 at 21; and 13-3 at 
69-70.
Evidence, apart from the foregoing, that Three Eagles' 
reason for the termination (i.e., that Seim was acting 
erratically and inappropriately, and thus was unfit to take to 
the airwaves) were pretextual include the fact that Seim had 
a history of good performance at Three Eagles and had in fact 
been praised for his outstanding performance. Docket No. 17-4 
at 4, f 8. On this record, a factfinder could infer a 
discriminatory motive in Three Eagles' decision to terminate 
Seim.
Given the foregoing, the Court denies Three Eagles' 
motion for summary judgment on Seim's perceived sexual 
orientation/same-sex sexual discrimination claims.
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C. Seim's Retaliation Claim
Seim also claims he was unlawfully retaliated against for 
submitting a complaint about Mr. Riker, in violation of VII. 
"Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against 
employees who oppose discriminatory practices." Lewis, 591 
F.3d at 1042 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). "The burden 
shifting McDonnell Douglas analytical framework applies to 
this inquiry as well, beginning with the three elements of a 
prima facie case of retaliation, whether: (1)the plaintiff 
engaged in protected conduct, including opposition to an 
action prohibited by Title VII; (2) [he] was subjected to an 
adverse employment action, and (3) there is a 'causal nexus 
between the protected conduct and the adverse action.'" 
Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Wallace, 442 F.3d at 1119).
"In making out a prima facie retaliation claim, [Seim] 
need not prove the merits of the underlying claim of sex 
discrimination." Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1042. "[He] can 
establish protected conduct 'as long as [he] had a reasonable, 
good faith belief that there were grounds for a claim of 
discrimination^]'" Id. (quoting Wallace, 442 F.3d at 1119). 
Three Eagles contends Seim's multiple complaints to management 
were not protected conduct. However, Seim specifically stated
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in several of his complaints that he was being discriminated 
against on the basis of his blood disease, as his numerous 
requests for accommodations were either ignored or denied, and 
he also complained that his reports of harassment and 
vandalism to Riker and other supervisors had never been acted 
upon. Seim thus has provided ample evidence showing he 
engaged in protected conduct by opposing illegal actions.
There is no dispute regarding whether Seim suffered an 
adverse employment action. And there is ample record evidence 
to support a causal nexus between that adverse employment 
action and Seim's complaints to management. Seim was
terminated the same day he sent one of these complaints to 
Three Eagles' corporate office and his immediate supervisors 
at the station. Further, the evidence of pretext discussed 
above applies with equal force in evaluating whether Seim has 
made out a prima facie retaliation claim.
Given the foregoing, the Court denies Three Eagles' 
motion for summary judgment on Seim's retaliation claim.
D. Seim's Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public 
Policy Claim
Finally, Seim claims that, under Iowa law, his
termination violated public policy. Three Eagles responds 
that this claim is preempted by the ICRA, which provides the
17
exclusive remedy for the sort of complained-of conduct related 
to this claim. The Court agrees.
The Iowa Supreme Court has held that "the ICRA, Iowa Code 
chapter 216 . . . , provides the exclusive remedy for
particular conduct prohibited under that statute." Channon v. 
UPS, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 857 (Iowa 2001) (citing Greenland 
v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993)); see also
Canterbury v. Federal-Mogul Ignition Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 
1112, 1118-19 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (holding that former employee's 
claim that he was wrongfully discharged, in violation of Iowa 
public policy, was preempted by the ICRA, as the public policy 
claim and ICRA claim involved the same conduct).
Accordingly, the Court grants Three Eagles' motion for 
summary judgment on Seim's wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy claim.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED that Three Eagles' motion 
for summary judgment (Docket No. 13) is GRANTED as to Mr. 
Seim's wrongful termination in violation of public policy 
claim. Three Eagles' motion for summary judgment is DENIED in 
all other respects.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of June, 2011.
Donald E. O'Brien, Senior Judge 
United States District Court 
Northern District of Iowa
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